* WNBA attendance dropped from an overall average of more than 10,000 in the late 1990s to a little under 7,000 just after the pandemic. (Note: It has increased since Caitlin Clark entered the franchise.)

* Expenses have gone up, most notably a $25 million per year commitment to fly WNBA teams by charter planes rather than on regular flights, as has been the case in the past.

* The WNBA salary cap has also risen incrementally, from $622,000 in 2003 (inflation-adjusted to 2025: $1.1 million) to $1.5 million in 2025. The league had one more team (14) in 2003 than it has now (13), although expansion teams are on their way, so the total cost of player pay has gone from a maximum of $15.4 million to $19.5 million.

* Generally, the less a league makes, the lower the share of revenue its players get – 50% of $1 billion is less of a chore to pay than 25% of $100 million.

The Bottom Line: You can’t compare an established billion-dollar business that has been profitable for decades with a startup business that is less than one-tenth the size and is – except for handouts from another organization (the NBA) – losing tons of money every year.

If you ask me – based on the one game I saw – if the WNBA players and their audiences (in this case, NYC) are on par with the NBA, I’d say yes. But product quality in business is only a small part of its financial value. On a P&L basis, the WNBA players are being paid fairly. On a percentage-of-franchise-equity-value, they are underpaid. But the value of the WNBA is make-believe. It’s not based on business economics, but on the perceived value of owning a prestige asset among a small group of multi-billionaires.

The positive news: if the WNBA can take its head out of its corporate ass and double down on the popularity of Caitlin Clark, it will be better for everyone – the owners, the fans, and the players.